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ALL OR NOTHING:
THIS IS THE QUESTION?
THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 3(2)
DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 95/46/
EC TO THE INTERNET
REBECCA WONGt AND JOSEPH SAVIRIMUTHUtt

I.

INTRODUCTION

The exponential growth of social networking Web sites, online personal journals and the use of multimedia by individuals, raises important questions about the compatibility of Article 3(2) of the Data
Protection Derivative 95/46/EC ("DPD") as applied to the internet. The
provisions in the DPD were designed to mediate between the rights of
freedom of expression and privacy, however, it is not entirely clear
whether the premises informing the scope of Article 3(2)1 can be insisted
upon in the light of the transformation taking place. Private individuals
t Grateful acknowledgments to the GikII participants held in London, September
2007 for their feedback to this paper. Rebecca Wong is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University with teaching and research interests in
Tort, Intellectual property, Data Protection and Cyberlaw. She specializes more specifically in data protection and privacy. She holds an LLB (1998), MSc (2000), LLM (2001),
PCHE (2004) and a PhD (University of Sheffield, 2007) in data protection. Her recent publications include Privacy: Chartingits Developments and Prospects, In: Human Rights in
the DigitalAge (2005), Data Protection Online: Alternative Approaches to Sensitive Data,
Journalof Commercial Law and Technology (2007), Demystifying Clickstream Data: a European/USperspective, 20 Emory InternationalLaw Review 563-590 (2007).
tt Joseph Savirimuthu is a Lecturer in Law at Liverpool Law School, University of
Liverpool. His teaching and research areas include: Internet Regulation and Governance,
Child Net Safety and Information Security. He holds an LLB (1987), LLM in International
Business Law (1988), Diploma in Legal Practice (1997), PGCE (2004) and Certificate in
Internet Child Safety (2007). His recent publications include P2P@softwar(e).com: Or the
Art of Cyberspace 3.0 (2007), DRMs, RFID and Disruptive Code: Architecture, Dystopiaand
Eunomics (2006), Reflections on the Google PrintLibrary Project (2006) and 'Open Source,
Code and The Architecture: It's the Memes Stupid' (2005).
1. Data Protection Directive 95/46, art. 3, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31-50 (E.C.) (providing
that the Directive will be inapplicable in two instances. The DPD excludes the processing of
personal data taking place as part of activities falling outside of Community law. Also, the
Directive is also deemed to be inapplicable if the processing of personal data is undertaken

242

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXV

can now assume a central role in the collection, processing, and distribution of data. Article 3(2) uses the European Court of Justice's ("ECJ")
holding in Lindqvist v. Jbnk~ping,2 as a framework for evaluating two
key issues raised by the emergence of new social spaces for processing
and disseminating information. First, it is not entirely clear from the
emerging post-Lindqvist jurisprudence, whether the extension of Article
3(2) may necessarily undermine the fundamental principle of fairness
and ultimately the coherence of the data protection legislation. 3 The second issue is whether alternative regulatory instruments may enable the
DPD to continue with its legal standard setting role. This article sets
forth two conclusions dealing with these issues. The first conclusion is
that it would be premature to extend the scope of Article 3(2). The second conclusion is that the future standard setting role of DPD must now
embrace the emerging reality of a gradual convergence between systems
of social interaction and systems of technological innovation.
II.

LINDQVIST: BALANCING THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
AND RIGHTS OF PRIVACY

New communication technologies and the Internet compel us to assess whether an optimal balance is currently maintained between the
rights of expression and privacy. The ECJ's ruling in Lindqvist provides
an illustration of the factors that must be taken into account when seeking to find a balance between the rights of privacy and freedom of
expression.
Before turning to the ECJ's ruling, it is pertinent to discuss some
account of the regulatory framework governing the processing of personal data under the DPD. The purpose is not to undertake an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence on this subject 4 but to highlight the
rationale and organizing principles. The standard setting function of
DPD cannot be properly understood without some familiarity with the
organizing principles that assist the ECJ in balancing the competing
claims made by litigants.
The DPD was passed in 1995 to harmonize the laws on data protection within the European Community. It required EU member states to
by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. It is the second
part of Article 3(2), which is examined in more detail).
2. Case C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist v. Jonkoping, 1 C.M.L.R. 20 (2003).
3. Data Protection Directive 95/46, art. 3, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31-50 (E.C.) (stating the
data protection legislation and what is principally referred to in the above text).
4. See LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAw: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC
AND LIMITS (2002) (analyzing the data protection laws); Christopher Kuner, EUROPEAN DATA

(2003); Rosemary Jay & Angus Hamilton,
(2d ed. 2003).

PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS
TION: LAW AND PRACTICE

DATA PROTEC-
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implement legislation by October 25, 1998. 5 This DPD is further supplemented by the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications
2002/58/EC ("DPEC"), which applies to the processing of personal information carried out "in connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications service in public communications networks in
the Community. '6 For the purposes of this article, only the latter half of
Article 3(2) of the DPD will be considered. The following principles can
be said to be key in the mediatory role of the DPD in balancing the competing interests between 'data controllers' and data subjects in respect of
the processing of personal data. These principles are:
Fairness
Lawfulness
Specificity
Adequacy
Accuracy
Non-excessiveness
7
Accessibility to the data subject.
These principles can be viewed as performing a standard setting
function in the sense that the activities of 'data controllers' are now
brought within a centralized regulatory framework designed to achieve
transparency, accountability, and consistency in the application of the
rules governing the collection, processing, and distribution of data. The
obligations imposed by the DPD on 'data controllers' in specified circumstances can serve as an illustration of the standard setting process, in
particular, the interplay of the principles of fairness and considerations
of efficiency. For example, in relation to matters involving the processing of sensitive information relating to sex, health, and race, explicit consent must be obtained from the subject.8 This requirement is relaxed
5. See Privireal, Data Protection-By Country, http://www.privireal.org/ (last visited
Mar. 20, 2007); DERYCK BEYLEVELD ET. AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DATA PROTECTION DiRECTIVE IN RELATION TO MEDICAL RESEARCH IN EUROPE (2004); European Commission, Sta-

tus of Implementation of Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data, http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation en.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
6. See also CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW: CORPORATE COMPLI-

ANCE AND REGULATION (2d ed. 2007) (analyzing the application of the Directive on Privacy
and Electronic Communications 2002/58/EC in the online environment).
7. See Data Protection Directive 95/46, art. 7, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (Article 7 provides
six criteria in which personal data can be processed legitimately. These include the (1) data
subject's unambiguous consent (2) where this was necessary for the performance of a contract or at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract (3) compliance
with a legal obligation.).
8. See also Privireal, Privacy in Research Ethics and Law, http://www.privireal.org/
content/recommendations/#Rece (last visited Apr. 2007) (The DPD does not define what
"explicit" consent is and there are different interpretations from EU Member States on
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where the processing is seen as necessary to enable the 'data controller'
to comply with obligations imposed by national laws or where the controller has legitimate interests in processing the data. The issues of explicit and implicit consent lie at the core of the standard setting role. The
intention here is that 'data controllers' will assume a primary role in establishing self-regulation processes that mirror the goals of the DPD.
Article 3(2) of the DPD can also be seen to embrace the goals of legitimacy and efficiency. Legitimacy corresponds with the expectation of citizens that exercises of authority to conform with constitutional norms
and principles. Efficiency is consonant with the idea that legitimate governance is alive to considerations of employing strategies that promote
compliance. The enactment provides that the obligations relating to the
processing of personal data are inapplicable in two specific circumstances. First, the processing of personal data is inapplicable in situations where the processing of that data falls outside the scope of
Community law. Secondly, the data is inapplicable in situations where
the person in the course of a purely personal or household activity, undertakes the processing of personal data. The decision to exempt these
obligations can be approached from two specific levels. First, at a constitutional level, any encroachment into the private, social spaces would be
seen as unjustified and contrary to prevailing social norms and values.
Comparatively, at a regulatory level, it is not feasible for the state or its
enforcement authorities to secure compliance with the obligations therefore, such obligations are inapplicable to the DPD. The ECJ gives a
glimpse of such ideas in its deliberations in Lindqvist.9
In Lindqvist, the Plaintiff had uploaded a Web site containing details about members of a Parish Church. The Website also contained information about a specific member, who had injured her foot. Lindqvist
did not obtain the consent of any of the individuals whose information
appeared in the Web site before posting the information. Lindqvist also
failed to inform the Swedish Data Inspection Board, the supervisory authority overseeing data protection, as to the publication of the sensitive
information regarding the health of the members of the Parish on the
Web site. In this case, the ECJ emphasized that the circumstances were
within the scope of the exemption stipulated in Article 3(2). The court
discussed that it may be seen as reasonable for individuals to discuss
events surrounding the church in the setting of a living room, however,
the public aspect of the publication of the events on the Internet, required the ECJ to sanction Lindqvist. According to the Court's ruling,
what constitutes explicit consent. The German Federal Data Protection (BDSG) requires
written consent before sensitive data can be processed. UK, however, does not require written consent to process sensitive data, so express consent (even given orally) will be sufficient, provided it is clear.).
9. Case C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist v. J6nkoping, 1 C.M.L.R. 20 (2003).
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the rights of privacy cannot be overridden by individuals, relying on the
defense of personal use and the freedom of expression' 0 as sufficient
cause.
Another way to read the Court's ruling in Lindqvist, requires that
any future attempts by individuals to post information about people on a
Web site, will not be allowed to treat their rights of expression as absolute, rather than discussing it as parts of a whole. However, at a policy
level, the approach adopted by the ECJ, suggested that the public interest in preserving privacy should not be ignored in the age of new communication technologies. A final point in Lindqvist, show that the ECJ was
not discussing that the content of the type published was prohibited, but
merely that the people presented on Lindqvist's Web site had an expectation of privacy and the right to be consulted, along with the opportunity
to determine the publication of such personal information. The ECJ held
that:
Thus, it is, rather, at the stage of the application at national level of
the legislation implementing Directive 95/46 in individual cases that a
balance must be found between the rights and interests involved. Consequently, it is for the authorities and courts of the Member States not only
to interpret their national law in a manner consistent with Directive 95/
46 but also to make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of it which
would be in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order or with the other general principles of Community
law, such as inter alia the principle of proportionality. Whilst it is true
that the protection of private life requires the application of effective
sanctions against people processing personal data in ways inconsistent
with Directive 95/46, such sanctions must always respect the principle of
proportionality. That is so a fortiori since the scope of Directive 95/46 is
very wide and the obligations of those who process personal data are
many and significant. The answer to the sixth question must, therefore
be that the provisions of Directive 95/46 do not, in themselves, bring
about a restriction which conflicts with the general principles of freedom
of expression or other freedoms and rights, which are applicable within
the European Union and are enshrined inter alia in Article 10 of the
ECHR. It is for the national authorities and courts responsible for applying the national legislation implementing Directive 95/46 to ensure a fair
balance between the rights and interests in question, including the fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order (emphasis
10. Data Protection Directive 95/46, art. 9, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (stating that "[m]ember
States shall provide for exemptions or derogations from the provisions of this Chapter,
Chapter IV and Chapter VI for the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of the artistic or literary expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression").
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added)."
The submissions made by the Swedish and the Netherlands' government during the court proceedings in Lindqvist, discussed the view that
Article 3(2) should not apply to instances involving the publication of
personal information on the Internet and in Web sites.
The Swedish government contended that Article 3(2) did not exempt
individuals who publish personal information to an indeterminate number of people on the Internet. 1 2 Similarly, the Netherlands' government
took the same view, holding that exceptions provided under Article 3(2)
do not apply in cases such as this, and the "creator of an Internet page
brings [sic] the data placed on it to the knowledge of a generally indeterminate group of people.' 3
The question is whether Lindqvist was able to use the Swedish ex14
emption as provided under Section 6 of the Personal Data Act 1998?
The ECJ held that the exception must be:
interpreted as relating only to activities which are carried out in the
course of private or family life of individuals. This is clearly not the
case with the processing of personal data consisting in publication on
the internet so that those data are made accessible to an indefinite number of people (emphasis added).
The ECJ's decision clarifies the extent to which individuals may be
able to benefit from Article 3(2), when placing personal information on
the Internet, however, it raises several questions. If it is accepted that
limiting access of an individual's Web page to family members will be
exempt from Article 3(2) DPD, such that the Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC does not apply, where does one draw the line for individuals
whose web pages may extend beyond family members?
For example, Joe Blogs runs a personal Webpage highlighting environmental concerns 15 and limits access to only a specific group of environmental activists. Would Article 3(2) DPD then apply on the basis
that Joe was running his Web page for personal purposes? An analysis
according to Lindqvist, would show that the burden would be on the Web
page's maker to show that the Webpage was intended to be used for private purposes and not personal purposes. The burden to show that this
Web page was intended for private purposes is a harder threshold to
11. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. 20 at paras. 85-90.
12. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. 20 at para. 31.

13. Id. at para. 32.
14. See also Lagen galler Aven fi6r annan behandling av personuppgifter [Swedish Per-

sonal Data Act] (Personuppgiftslagen [SFS] 1998:204) (Swed.), available at http://www.
sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/01/55/42/b451922d.pdf (discussing that Sec. 6 of the Swedish
Personal Data Act is not applicable to "processing of personal data that a natural person
performs in the course of activities of a purely private nature").
15. This is a hypothetical example.
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prove versus showing that it was used for personal purposes. Furthermore, it would be difficult to prove whether the author intended the Web
page to be used for private purposes, therefore satisfying the threshold
set forth by the Court.
The ECJ took a narrow approach to the interpretation of Article 3(2)
as applied to the Internet, however the decision in Lindqvist draws a
distinction between private and public access on the Internet. Article
3(2) of the DPD places a burden on individuals to limit access of their
Web pages to a defined group before such individuals might benefit from
the Article. However, when applied to blogs/podcasts (aside from the
technological solutions that are available), this can be problematic for
the courts in determining which Webpage should be accessible or not.
Recital 12 states that the interpretation of Article 3(2) of the DPD,
"[wihereas there should be excluded the processing of data carried out by
a natural person in the exercise of activities which are exclusively personal or domestic, such as correspondence and the holding of records of
addresses." Clearly, it appears that Article 3(2) should be construed narrowly in the light of the ECJ's decision in Lindqvist, but such a narrow
interpretation raises certain questions.
III.

IMPLICATIONS ARISING FROM LINDQVIST

In this section, we explore the main implications arising from the
Lindqvist decision and the effect the decision had on several EU member
states in their decision making policies towards data protection.
A.

LEGISLATIVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEMBER STATES' DATA
PROTECTION LAWS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE

DPD

3.2

TO THE INTERNET

Based on where an individual is located, there are likely to be differences in the interpretation and the application of Article 3(2) as implemented by member states' data protection laws. The salient features of
the National Data Protection Laws are described in the following sections of this Essay.
1. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom Data Protection Act 1998 ("DPA") replaces the
1984 Data Protection Act and implements the DPD. The DPA took effect
on March 1, 2000. Currently, changes have been made to the DPA
through the Freedom of Information Act of 2000 ("FIOA"). 16 These
changes include the definition of 'data', and the change of the supervisory authority's name from the Data Protection Commissioner to the In16. Freedom of Information Act, 2000, c. 36, sched. 2 (U.K.).

248

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXV

formation Commissioner. 17
Before discussing this issue further the definitions of 'data' and 'personal data' must be addressed. "Data" is defined under Section 1 of the
DPA as information which:
is being processed by means of equipment operating automatically in
response to instruments given for that purpose,
is recording with the intention that it should be processed by means of
such equipment,
is recorded as part of a relevant filing system or with the intention that
it should form part of a relevant filing system,
does not fall within paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) but form part of an accessi8
ble record as defined by Section 68 of the DPA,1
is recorded information held by a public authority and does not fall
within any of paragraphs (a) to (d). 19
"Personal data" is defined under Section 1 of the DPA as:
Data which relate to a living individual who can be identified:
from those data; or
from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or
is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller, and includes
any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the
intentions of the data controller or any other person in respect of that
20
individual.

The definition of "personal data" has, however, been narrowly restricted in the recent Court of Appeal's decision in Durant v. Financial
Services Authority, which held that:
[N]ot all information retrieved from a computer search against an individual's name or unique identifier is personal data within the Act. Mere
mention of the data subject in a document held by a data controller does
not necessarily amount to his personal data. Whether it does so in any
particular instance depends on where it falls in a continuum of relevance or proximity to the data subject as distinct, say, from transactions
or matters in which he may have been involved to a greater or lesser
17. Id.
18. Accessible record is defined under Sec. 68 as education, health or accessible public
record and was created under the DPA, but not found in the Data Protection Directive 95/
46/EC.
19. Added following the FOIA.
20. The DPD places an emphasis on and discusses a 'natural person' as a living individual, but does not expressly provide for legal persons (ie: corporations, companies, etc.),
hence the specific reference in terminology. There has been some academic discussion that
focused on whether the DPD applies to deceased individuals, the idea being that even if
they cannot make a request, then their estate would be premitted. However, this would be
stretching the definition of a 'natural person'. See Privireal, Recommendations, http://
www.privireal.org/content/recommendations/#Recf, (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
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degree. It seems to me that there are two notions that may be of assistance. The first is whether the information is biographicalin a significant sense, that is, going beyond the recording of the putative data
subject's involvement in a matter or an event that has no personal connotations, a life event in respect of which his privacy could not be said to
be compromised. The second one of focus. The information should have
the putative data subject as its focus ratherthan some other person with
whom he may have been involved or some transaction or event in which
he may have figured or have had an interest, for example, as in this
case, an investigation into some other person's or body's conduct that he
21
may have instigated (emphasis added).
Irrespective of the ECJ's recent Lindqvist decision, which interpreted "personal data" in light of the DPD, 22 it is arguable that the mere
mention of an individual on a Web page will not be sufficient to constitute "personal data" under the DPA. An essential factor in determining
whether a Web page is 'personal data' is whether an individual's privacy
has been compromised. This is balanced with other factors, such as, the
freedom of expression as provided under Article 10 of the European
Court of Human Rights ("ECHR").
There have been relatively few cases brought under the DPA regarding blogs and Web pages whereby individuals are prosecuted for placing
personal other's personal information on Webpages, regardless of
whether the site is accessible by the public.I It is unclear why this is the
case, in a recent correspondence with the United Kingdon Office of the
Information Commissioner on the publication of personal information on
the Internet, the following reply was given:
We have in the past received correspondence about data published on
Web sites run by private individuals, such as amateur genealogy Web
sites and personal home pages. Processing in these cases is often exempt from the DPA by virtue of the exemption of section 36.. .There is,
therefore, no action the Commissioner can take in response to such
23
complaints.
Section 36 of the DPA provides that personal data processed by an
individual only for the purposes of that individual's personal, family or
household affairs (including recreational purposes), are exempt from the
DPA. 24 However, there are difficulties with reconciling Section 36 of the
21. Durant v. Fin. Servs. Auth., [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1746 (U.K.).
22. See also Mark Watts, Information, data and personal data - reflections on Durant
v. Financial Services Authority, 22 Computer L. & Sec. Rep. 320 (2006); Lilian Edwards,
Taking the 'Personal'out of Personal Data: Durant v. FSA and its Impact on the Legal
Regulation Of CCTV, 2004 SCRIPT-ED 341, available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/
script-edlissue2/durant.asp> (discussing 'person data').
23. Written response from the UK Information Commissioner's Office (Apr. 26, 2006).
24. Id.
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DPA with the ECJ's decision in Lindqvist. To recapitulate, the ECJ held
in Lindqvist that:
The act of referring, on an internet page, to various persons and identifying them by name or by other means, for instance by giving their telephone number or information regarding their working conditions and
hobbies, constitutes the processing of personal data wholly or partly by
automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of per25
sonal data and on the free movement of such data (emphasis added).
Although, the ECJ dealt with the subject of processing personal
data, there was clearly no question that the posted information was "personal information." However, it is also difficult to reconcile the decision
in Lindqvist with that in Durant.
The decision in Durant takes a practical approach to the interpretation of "personal data" so it excludes cases that are not clear cut, against
individuals who make a passing reference to individuals on their
Webpages. However, Durant does not detract from the idea that a person is still posting other people's "personal data" on their Web site, as
defined under the DPD. Article 2(a) of the DPD broadly defines "personal" as:
[A]ny information relating to an identified or identifiable naturalperson
('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.
The Court of Appeal, in dealing with personal information, should
have considered the exemptions provided under the DPA, rather than
rule directly on whether the data was "personal". Such exemptions under
the DPA include: special purposes of processing for journalistic, artistic,
and literary purposes 26 Likewise, the Court of Appeal should have ruled
as provided under Sections 27-39 of the DPA 27 By the Court of Appeal
limiting the definition of the scope of "personal data", the decision in Durant, not only has the difficulty of reconciling the decision in Lindqvist,
but can be criticized that the DPA is weak by comparison to other Member States' 28 data protection laws.
25. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. 20.
26. Data Protection Act, 1998, c.29 §3 (U.K.). (defining "special purposes," which are to
be interpreted in light of Section 32 of the DPA, discussing journalism, literature, and art).
27. Id. at §27-39 (U.K.) (exempting the processing for purposes of national security
(§ 28), crime and taxation (§ 29), health, education, and social work (§ 30), regulatory activity (§ 31), journalism, literature, and art (§ 32), research, history, and statistics (§ 33), and
domestic purposes (§ 36).
28. Durant v. Fin. Servs. Auth. [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1746 (U.K.); see e.g., Ragnhildur
Guamundsd6ttir v. State of Iceland, [2003] (Ice.) No. 151/2003, available at http://www.
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Sweden

Sweden was the first country to have data protection laws. 2 9 The
Swedish Personal Data Act ("PDA") implements the DPD. 30 Before looking at the relevant provision, this it is relevant to include a brief background of the PDA. 3 1
When the PDA was enacted, it was met with opposition from newspapers and the general public. According to Seipel, there were three
main criticisms of the PDA. First, the PDA was considered a serious
threat to the freedom of speech and civil liberties. 3 2 However, the recent
Ramsbro3 3 decision by the Swedish Supreme Court considered the exemptions provided under Article 9 (as implemented under the PDA
1998). In part, this decision addressed the question of processing for the
purposes of "journalistic, artistic and literary purposes." This subject
will be revisited in more detail, later in the article.
A second criticism of the PDA was that the DPD was outdated and
that the Swedish legislators had to look for national solutions based on
the regulation of misuse, rather than adopt an inclusive "processing
model" as covered under the DPD. The changes to the PDA to adopt a
misuse-orientated approach has now taken effect as of January 2007. 34 ,
epic.org/privacy/genetic/iceland-decision.pdf; see also Renate Gertz, An Analysis of the Icelandic Supreme Court Judgment on the Health Sector DatabaseAct, 2004 ScRiPT-ED 241,
available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/issue2/iceland.asp.
29. See Peter Seipel, Nordic Data Protection Law 123-51 (2001); see also S. Oman, Implementing Data Protection Law, in 47 Scandinavian Studies in Law IT Law 391 (Peter
Wahlgren ed., 2004); Mathias Klang, Technology, Speech, Law & Ignorance: The State of
Free Speech in Sweden, 1 Hertfordshire L.J. 48 (2003); David H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies: the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, France, Canada
and the US (1989); Rebecca Wong, The Shape of Things to Come: Swedish Developments on
the Protection of Privacy, 2005 SCRIPT-ED 98, available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uklahrc/
script-edlvol2-1/wong.asp.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Seipel, supra note 33, at 19. The opposition became so tremendous that academics
such as Professor Jacob Palme became involved in the debate. Jacob Palme, Critical Review of the Swedish Data Act (July 6, 1998) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
people.dsv.su.se/-jpalme/society/data-act-analysis.html; Jacob Palme, Freedom of Speech,
the EU Data Protection Directive and the Swedish Personal Data Act (June 9, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://people.dsv.su.se/-jpalme/society/eu-data-directive-freedom.html.
33. Hogsta Domstolen [HD] [Supreme Court] 2001-12-06 (Swed.), available at http://
dsv.su.se/jpalme/society/Ramsbro-HD-domen.html.
34. See Government Offices of Sweden, Data Protection, http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/
d/2771jsessionid=ATUP2FKsfaba (last visited April 2007) (explaining the background of
the Swedish misuse-orientated approach); see also Government Offices of Sweden, Personal
Data Protection:Information on the PersonalData ProtectionAct, http://www.sweden.gov.
se/content/l/c6/07/43/65/Oea2c0eb.pdf (last visited April 2007) (providing background of the
Personal Data Protection Act); see also Josefine Johnson, Proposal to Amend the Swedish
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Section 6 of the PDA provides that, "[t]his Act does not apply to such
processing of personal data that a natural person performs in the course
of activities of a purely private nature." This provision is likely to be interpreted in the same way as Lindqvist was. The misuse-orientated approach means that activities involving E-mail processing and Internet
publishing, may be exempt from the PDA, if one can show that the PDA
does not cause harm to the individual nor intrude their personal integrity. 3 5 The PDA principally applies to processing that involves unstructured materials, such as running texts, sounds, and images. Materials
that are structured to significantly facilitate searches for, or compilations of, personal data, such as personal data registers and personal
data-related databases, would still fall within the scope of the PDA.
What begins to emerge as a result, is a two-staged test as provided
under the PDA. This test requires one to first consider the application of
the PDA under Section 6 in the light of Lindqvist. If Section 6 does not
apply, one would then consider whether the misuse-orientated approach
could exempt the activities (unstructured files) in question. Although
such a two-staged approach would appear cumbersome, the Swedish
Legislative Authorities bravely attempted to deal with the application of
their data protection laws to the internet. This is particularly the case
with the growth of blogs, podcasts, and Web 2.0. However, the adoption
of the misuse-orientated approach only provides a short-term solution.
Whether legislative change is adopted throughout Europe is less than
36
clear.
3. Norway
Although Norway is not part of the European Union, but rather part
of the European Economic Area, the country has enacted data protection
laws since 1978. The first data protection law was the Data Registers
Act. 3 7 The present data protection law is the Norwegian Personal Data
PersonalDataAct: The First Steps Towards a Misuse-OrientatedLegislation, http://www.
twobirds.com/english/publications/articles/SwedishPersonalDataAct.cfm
(Mar. 22,
2006) (proposing to amend the Swedish Personal Data Act), and Wong, supra note 28 at 18;
Regeringskansliet, available at, http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/06/08/09/2cOa24ce.
pdf.
35. See Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and
Limits 129 (2002) (claiming that "personal integrity is a question determined by the Swedish courts).
36. Oman, supra note 29.
37. See Bygrave, supra note 38 (providing a background of Norwegian data protection
law); see also Lee A. Bygrave & A.H.Aar?, InternationalPrivacy, Publicity and Personality
Laws 333-46 (Michael Henry ed., 2000); and Privireal, Norway: Data Protection, http:/!
www.privireal.org/content/dp/norway.php (last visited March 2007).
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Act 2000 ("PDA 2000"), which took effect on January 1, 2001.38 Prior to
the Lindqvist decision, individuals were not prosecuted for publishing
personal information on the Internet if they could show that the
Webpage was intended for private purposes. 39 "Private purposes" were
interpreted broadly to include a number of Websites that were set up for
private purposes, such as an individual's hobby interests. However, the
Norwegian Data Inspecorate is in the process of reviewing this provision.
Professor Bygrave and Professor Schartum, two experts on the subject,
have written a report 40 recommending changes to the existing Norwegian data protection law. They propose to amend the PDA 2000 so that it
is consistent with the Lindqvist decision. It is not clear whether the Norwegian Authorities will adopt this proposal, but already, the repercussions of the Lindqvist decision are noticeable.
4.

41

Germany

The Federal Data Protection Act of 2001, or Bundesdatenschutzgesetz ("BDSG"), 42 implements the DPD, and regulates the federal
government agencies; private bodies; and state (Ldnder) data protection
laws 4 3 that apply to their own public bodies. The relevant provision
under the FDPA 200144 provides:
The Act shall apply to the collection, processing and use of personal
data by:
38. See Personal Data Act, 2001, (Nor.), http://www.datatilsynet.no (last visited Feb.
15, 2008).
39. See Dag W. Schartum, Nordic Data Protection 104 (Peter Blume ed., 2001).
40. Professor dr. juris Dag Wiese Schartum Forsteamanuensis & Dr. juris Lee A. Bygrave, Utredningav Behov for Endringeri Personopplysningsloven(March 31, 2006), http:/
/www.personvern.uio.no/pvpn/artikler/utredning-personopplysningsloven.pdf (last visited
Feb. 15, 2007).
41. Grateful acknowledgments to Dr Jorg Hladjk, Hunton and Williams for his
assistance.
42. See The Federal Data Protection Act , translated in http://www.bfdi.bund.del
cln029/nn-946430/EN/DataProtectionActs/Artikel/Bundesdatenschutzgesetz-FederalData
ProtectionActtemplateld=rawproperty=publicationFie.pdf/BundesdatenschutzgesetzFederalDataProtectionAct.pdf; see also DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIEs: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA AND

THE U.S. (1989); see also Herbert Burkert, Privacy/Data Protection: A German/European
Perspective, http://www.mpp-rdg.mpg.de/pdf datfburkert.pdf; SPIROS
S IMITIS,
BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ, 6th rev. ed., (2006) (providing a commentary into the German
data protection laws).
43. European Commission, Status of implementation of Directive 95/46 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data, http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation en.htm#germany (giving a list of Linder data
protection laws).
44. See also Simitis, supra note 44.
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Private bodies in so far as they process or use data by means of data
processing systems or collect data for such systems, process or use data
in or from non-automated filing systems or collect data for such systems,
except where the collection, processing or use of such data is effected
solely for personal or family activities (emphasis added).
A restrictive interpretation is applied to fulfil the obligation of the
Act under international law. 45 For example, processing was shown to be
used exclusively for private purposes, such as a personal electronic organizer. Furthermore, this provision will have to be construed in accordance with of the Lindquist decision. It is important to draw a
distinction between processing for personal and professional purposes.
What is personal depends on the general views of society at any given
point in time. 4 6 For instance, if used for private purposes, today's society views, addresses, phone numbers, web addresses, e-mail addresses,
birthdays of colleagues, as well as other information regarding friends
and relatives as personal. However, while the aforementioned examples
would be private, the distinctions are not always clear when applied to
the Internet. This is particularly true when the distinction is to be made
47
with respect to the information available through social networking.
48
The German Telemedia Act of 2007 or Telemediengesetz ("TMG")
has recently been enacted. The TMG replaces the Teleservices Data Protection Act, and the Federal Media Services Treaty. 49 The TMG was enacted in March of 2007, and applies to electronic information, as well as,
communication services, including Webpages, music download platforms, Internet search engines and E-mails. The TMG applies to most
Web pages, but in Germany, independent of the Federal Data Protection
Act 2001. In a presentation given by Dr. Weichert, 50 head of the Centre
for Data Protection in Schleswig-Holstein, the view was that the TMG
did not apply to private homepages that were used for private and family
purposes. However, there are problems differentiating between a
Webpage created by an individual that is maintained for private purposes, and a Webpage that forms part of a social networking Website.
On such example of this is registering on a Web site such as Myspace. As
a result, there is no definitive answer to such a grey area. Differences
Id. Grateful acknowledgments to Dr Jorg Hladjk for his views.
Id.
Web 2.0 etc. is a topic which is explored later.
Telemediengesetz, http://bundesrecht.juris.de/tmg/index.html, See LEE A BYGRAVE,
DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITs 328-29 (2002).
49. Henning Krieg, German Telemedia Act Introduces New Rules For New Media,
http://www.twobirds.com/englishpublications/articles/GermanTeleMedia Act new_
rules.cfm (March 3, 2007).
50. Dr. Thilo Weichert, Das neue Telemediengesetz - TMG, https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/vortraege/20070423-weichert-tmg.pdf (April 23, 2007).
45.
46.
47.
48.
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can be drawn between a Webpage solely maintained by an individual for
private purposes, and Webpages that are formed as part of a social
networking Website accessible to anybody, such a distinction can might
be too simplistic when discussing the structure of the Internet. 5 1
The TMG utilizes definitions similar to those contained in the preceding law, the Teleservices Data Protection Act 199752 ("TDDSG"), and
regulates telemedia service providers. 53 Although the TMG utilizes the
same definitions as the TDDSG, for "contractual data" and "utilization
data" 54 there have been criticisms made against the TMG for not reaching as far as it had originally been anticipated. For example, VoIP is
covered under the German Telecommunications Act 2004, 5 5 but not
under the TMG. However, video streaming is covered under the TMG.
In short, the TMG is unlikely to apply to private Webpages that are
maintained by individuals. However, it is certain that more clarity is
needed as to the TMG's application to Websites that are not managed by
private individuals, but form part of social networking Web sites, such as
MySpace. The main determinate in situations where this becomes an
issue is who is the "data controller." By identifying who the data controller is, it will be easier to determine who is required to adhere to the relevant data protection laws before deciding whether social networking
Web sites (MySpace; Facebook) fall outside the scope of the Data Protection. This may happen either through Article 3(2) DPD as implemented
under the DPD or under the exemptions under Article 9 for special purposes, or Article 13 of DPD as implemented under corresponding data
protection laws.
As set out in Article 1.1 of the DPD, imbalance exists in the protection offundamental rights and freedoms of individuals because the DPD
51.

See also

JACK GOLDSMITH

& TIM Wu,

WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET

RENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE

(1999);

(2006); LAU-

ANDREW MURRAY, THE REGU-

(2007).
52. See Teleservices Data Protection Act of 1997, http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/
TDDSG.htm (providing an English translation of the Teleservices Data Protection Act
1997, without the 2001 amendments); see also Teleservices Data Protection Act of 1997,
http://www.artikel5.de/gesetze/tddsg.html, (providing the German version of the Teleservices Data Protection Act 1997, including the 2001 amendments); See Lee A Bygrave, German Teleservices Data Protection Act, 5 Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 53-54 (1998),
available at http://folk.uio.no/lee/oldpage/articles/GermanyTDPA.pdf (giving a brief background of the Teleservices Data Protection Act 1997).
53. See § 13 of the TMG (setting forth the duties of Telemedia Service Providers).
54. See §§ 14-15 of the TMG for definitions of "contractual data" and "utilization data";
see also Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits
48 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002.
55. See Telecommunications Act 2004 ("TKG"), http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cln_030/nn94
6430/EN/DataProtectionActs/ArtikellrelecommunicationsActTKGtemplateld=rawprperty=PublicationFile.pdf/TelecommunicationsAct-TKG.pdf.
LATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT
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is favors the privacy 5 6 of an individual moreso than information being
posted on the Internet without their approval. Consequently, this leads
to the encroachment of another's right to express without being subject
to the data protection laws. 5 7 If a literal interpretation of Article 3.2 is
applied, then a consequence may be the Courts being overprotective of an
individual's privacy, when such privacy is not being affected or misused.
It is possible that that the protection of one's right to have his or her
personal information protected is also a restriction on another person's
right to express his or her views online and as a result, may become a
consequence of such interpretation of Article 3.2 of the DPD. Article 1.1
of the DPD does not simply protect the privacy of an individual, but also
the fundamental rights, and freedoms of individuals, including the free58
dom of expression.
B.

WHAT IS CONSIDERED "PRIVATE" ON THE INTERNET?

The Lindqvist case redefines what is private on the internet. It has
the undesirable effect of creating a public/private partition by placing an
burden on individuals to limit access of their Webpages, if they want to
be exempted from coverage under Article 3(2) of the DPD. Thus, it is
arguable that the fostering of "social networking", through the use of
such social networking Web site such as Facebook and MySpace, may be
inhibited as a result of the Lindqvist decision. There exists further difficulty in determining the nexus group in which an individual may benefit.
In other words, would an individual still be able to qualify under the
exemption on the basis that his Webpage is accessible to those who are
not family members? A narrow interpretation of Article 3(2) of the DPD
would take the approach of limiting access of a Webpage to family members. On the other hand, a broader interpretation would include individuals, other than family members as those that would have limited access
to the Web page. The lack of precedent in this area leaves this question
open, but if one were to consider the legislators of the DPD's original
intentions, then a limited interpretation would be used.
56. The authors will not discuss the subject of "privacy," as this has been covered elsewhere. See also, 1 Privacy: International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory (E.M.
Barendt ed., Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth 2001); Colin J Bennett & Charles D Raab, The
Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global Perspective (Aldershot: Ashgate
2003); Lee A Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching Its rationale, Logic and Limits
125-36 (Kluwer Law International 2002); 2 Privacy: International Library of Essays in Law
and Legal Theory, (Raymond Wacks ed., New York Univ. Press 1993); R. Wong, Privacy:
ChartingIts Development and Prospects, in Human Rights in the Digital Age 146-61 (Mathias Klang & Andrew Murray eds., 2005).
57. Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC leaves it to the discretion of
Member States to derogate, but the ECJ's ruling has left it to the national courts to decide.
58. See also Deryck Beyleveld, Overview of Directive 95/46/EC, http://www.privireal.

org/content/dp/directivecommentary.php (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
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C.

THE ISSUE OF "PERSONAL DATA"

The DPD takes a wider definition to "personal data". Article 2(a) defines "personal data" as:
[Any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ("data subject"); an identifiable person is one who can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particularby reference to an identificationnum-

ber or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity (emphasis added).
Recital 26 of the DPD further provides that:
[w]hereas the principles of protection must apply to any information
concerning an identified or identifiable person; whereas, to determine
whether a person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the
means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller or by any
other person to identify the said person; whereas the principles of protection shall not apply to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the
data subject is no longer identifiable.
The wide definition 59 of the DPD means that personal information of
cursory reference is likely to fall within the realm of the DPD, which the
60
ECJ's Lindqvist decision also reflects.
First, preliminary observations suggest that varying approaches to
the scope of Article 3(2) indicate an ongoing assessment of the standard
setting role of DPD. Second, the discussions about the remit of the DPD,
and effective governance is particularly relevant to the present debate on
the way information communication technologies shape expectations
about the way individuals view the Internet, and issues relating to the
management of their identity. Issues concerning technological innovation, and changing expectations of identity may render the seemingly
standard, setting role under the DPD to appear inconsequential. The
Essay will now briefly discuss social networking Websites to highlight
their technological, and social significance, in order to properly address
these Web sites' potential impact on the DPD.
IV.

SOCIAL NETWORKING SPACES

New technologies are now facilitating the creation of social spaces
for interaction. The rise in media literacy, increased Internet penetration, and cheap broadband access has led to the growth of blogs, and
59. The UK's definition of 'personal data" in Durant v. FSA is not considered in this
article.
60. Data Protection Directive 95/46, Article 3(2), 1995 E.C.; Case C-101/01, Lindqvist
v. Jonkoping, 2003 E.C.R. 12,971, [2004] 1 C.M.L.R. 20; See also Posting of Douwe Korff to
A Free Man in Preston, http://afreemaninpreston.blogspot.com/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2007)
(discussing personal data as implemented by EU Member States).
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Websites for user-generated content such as YouTube. 6 1 Web sites such
as Youtube show some of the ways that technological innovation and
end-to-end architecture is converging with emerging social attitudes towards information, identity, and privacy. Information, or data resources
can be used, recreated, and shared on such Web site. According to the
Pew & Internet American Life Project, teenagers today are leveraging
the interactive capabilities of the Internet to create, and share their own
media creations. 62 Many individuals now upload videos, photos, and digital images onto Websites. Furthermore, individuals are now comfortable with the idea of archiving their interests, or profiles online. 6 3 Blogs
(otherwise known as personal Web site) often contain reflections,
thoughts, or observations on current affairs, lifestyles, or personal interests. 64 Some authors also use blogs as communication spaces to meet
other users with interests in sport, photography, food, entertainment, or
fashion. These personal Websites also have podcasts 6 5 that visitors
download from the Web site. Other Websites allow individuals to
upload, and share photos. 6 6 Emerging social networking sites such as,
Wallop take the idea of self expression one stage further than most per68
sonal Web sites. 67 As the information on the site states:
Wallop is a new type of social networking site combined with a marketplace for buying and selling graphical effects called Wallop Mods for
your profile. At Wallop we believe the next wave is all about self expression online similar to the ways we express ourselves in the real world by
purchasing clothes, decorating a room or wearing jewelry. While Wallop
is great for communicating with your friends, it is also a rich platform for
Flash designers and content creators to develop Mods and make money
doing it. We make it easy for you to design and create Mods that allow
61. YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
62. See Amanda Lenhart & Mary Madden, Pew Internet & American Life Project,
Teen Content Creators and Consumers (2005), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPTeens
_ContentCreation.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2007) (identifying that there was a large uptake in younger teens in creating content on the internet).
63. See Michelle Young, Blogging: An Introductory Look at an Old Pastime in a New
Medium (2006), 23 Library Hi Tech News 27-28, available at http://callcentrediary.blog
spot.coml (providing a personal diary of a team manager at a call center).
64. Wikipedia, Blog, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (last visited Feb. 15, 2007). The
content, as well as, the quality of the blogs will vary depending on the authors. See generally Richard Wray, How One Year's Digital Output Would Fill 161bn iPods, The Guardian,
Mar. 6, 2007, available at http://technology.guardian.co.uk/news/story/0,,2027327,00.html.
65. Podcasts are MP3 audio recordings of interests that Web site authors can make
themselves.
66. See, e.g., Flickr, http://www.flickr.com/ (last visited Apr. 2007).
67. See generally Wallop, http://www.wallopcorp.com/ (last visited Apr. 2007); SubTV
Home Page, http://www.SUB.tv (last visited Apr. 2007).
68. Wallop Modder Network, http://designer.wallop.com/ (last visited Apr. 2007).
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69
people to express themselves!
Blogs are frequently used to debate cultural, religious, or political
70
In the legal
issues. Other blogs border on more intimate activities.
academy, blogs have become a popular avenue through which ideas are
the search enexchanged, and disseminated. According to Technorati,
71
gine blog directory, there are over 112.8 million blogs.

Another example of the way individuals use and manage informa72
tion, is on social networking sites like Bebo, MySpace, and Lunarstorm.
Blogs have evolved from being pure Online diaries into social networks.
73
This site
Consider for example, the social networking site Facebook.
their
to
find
individual
has search and browser facilities to enable an
ColSchool,
friends, persons living in a particular area, or studying at a
74
to
reflect
begun
also
Social networking sites have
lege, or University.
75
commercial interests.
With the convergence of the multimedia, and communication platforms, "moblogs" (mobile phone blogs) have enabled mobile phone users
to use the mobile network to capture videos, take photographs, and distribute text and media. 76 As with blogs, moblogs frequently contain a
biography of the author and a calendar record of when entries are made.
Mobloggers post information to a moblog to communicate, and record experiences, thoughts, opinions, news, events, or keep a diary. Advances in
the accessibility to, and quality of, media available allow users to post
entries in various formats, i.e. text, digital photography, video, and/or
sound files.
These sites underscore the growing acceptance of social networking
sites as environments for having fun, social ecosystems for information
sharing spaces, and opportunities to make connections with the wider
community.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Belle de Jour, http:/Ibelledejour-uk.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 2007)
(containing diary entries from a London call girl).
71. Technorati, http://technorati.com/aboutl (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
72. See Amanda Lenhart & Mary Madden, Pew Internet & American Life Project,
Teen, Privacy & Online Social Networks (2007), available at http:/www.pewinternet.org/
pdfs/PIPTeensPrivacySNSReportFinal.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2007).
73. Facebook Home Page, http://www.facebook.com/.
74. Id.
75. See Wade Roush, Social Networking 3.0: The thirdgeneration of social-networking
technology has hit the Web, and it's about content as much as contacts, Technology Review,
Nov. 18, 2005, availableat http://www.technologyreview.com/printer friendly-article.aspx?
id=15908; see also Seth Finkelstein, Blogs are no longerfree from everyday commercial, The
Guardian, Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://technology.guardian.co.uk/opinion/story/0,,201
2801,00.html.
76. Moblogs Home Page, http://www.moblogs.com.au; see also MMS Blogs Home Page,
www.mms-blogs.com.
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Preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing brief examination of the way individuals access new technology, and use information in the marketplace of ideas. First, individuals have a range of
new technologies for accessing media, and sharing information. Second,
increased connectivity has also increased individual exposure, and immersion to information. Third, as individuals spend more time in the
social spaces, we can detect a shift in cultural attitudes towards space,
information, identity, and privacy. Strangely enough, the concept of privacy is shaped by the original idea behind the Internet, which is to create
an environment for the free flow of information. One clear illustration of
the way the Internet is fulfilling its role in this context, is the blurring of
the space between public and private. For example, in the privacy of
one's home, one could publish personal or private information online
through a Blackberry, mobile phone, or wireless laptop. The data or information transmitted using these devices, becomes a central part of the
interactive process of creation, use, and distribution. Fourth, society's
understanding, and expectations about the ready availability, and use of
information is being gradually shaped by the new social ecosystem. In
this respect, the terms of service policies often found in social networking
sites represent a new form of negotiation taking place between data
providers, data controllers, and data subjects.
So how does this account complement the constitutional/regulatory
paradigm of fairness and efficiency? A preliminary consideration is that
information is now readily accessible in the social ecosystem. The endto-end architecture, the speed, and scale of the technological innovation
have provided much of the impetus for the free flow of information, and
content creation. Identity management and privacy considerations now
compete with market expectations of choice, availability, and efficiency.
These considerations emphasize the importance of refusing to isolate the
DPD framework from the broader relational dynamics between the individual, and media. Some of the strategies being adopted reflect the embryonic negotiation process mediated by software code, contractual
instrument, and ideas about property and are not being currently witnessed. Put another way, Article 3(2) issues are potentially being resolved through social network spaces. For example, individuals who
subscribe to Web sites such as Bebo, are reminded that:
Whenever you voluntarily post personal information in public areas,
like journals, webLogs, message boards, and forums, you should be
aware that this information can be accessed by the public and can in
turn be used by others to send you unsolicited communications. Please
exercise discretion in deciding what information you disclose. 77
77. Id.

2008]

ALL OR NOTHING: THIS IS THE QUESTION?

Additionally, MySpace has an indexing system that classifies communities through groups. This means that if an individual wanted to
join a "private group,"according to Article 3(2) of the DPD, that person
would first have to become a member, and login to MySpace. This person
then has the ability to chose a group and apply to join such group. 78
Upon approval, the new member of group would have access to personal
information not visible to non-members of such group.
However, the above issues should not detract from the dangers of
personal information being posted on the Internet. In a recent article
dealing with the data protection issues raised by blogs, it was observed
that:
Private facts are personal details about someone that have not been
disclosed to the public. A person's sexual gender-preference, a sexchange operation, and a private romantic liaison could all be private
facts. Once publicly disclosed by that person, however, they move into
the public domain. The Directive concerning the processing of personal
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (2002/58/EC), Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
establish a Europe-wide set of legal principles for privacy protection
which are enacted in all EU Member States and Council of Europe (CoE)
Member States, respectively. The overall objective of the Directives is
79
the protection of information privacy by Member States of the EU.
Bloggers, who post photos from Flickr onto their sites will be deemed
to accept the privacy policies of their hosts or service providers. For example, Yahoo's privacy policy permits bloggers on their site to specify
whether they want their photographs to be accessible to the public, selected individuals, or only themselves. 8 0 However, Yahoo may use the
photographs to target advertisements based on the metadata and notes
associated with the photo that the blogger posts. Advertisers may have
the ability, through the same information, to target the individuals that
appear in the posted photograph, as well.
Social networking spaces provide an apt illustration of how policymakers, industry and society are forced to leverage the innovative and
social potential of the Internet, and at the same time deal with regulatory implications for DPD. A brief summary will highlight the difficult
policy questions and tradeoffs facing society.
78. An example of such a group on Myspace is the 'Smiles Group". Myspace
Homepage, http://groups.myspace.com/smiles (last visited Mar. 2008).
79. Sylvia Mercado-Kierkegaard, Blogs, Lies and the Doocing: The Next Hotbed of Litigation?, 22(2) Comp. Law and Sec. Report, 127-36 (2006).
80. Yahoo: Flickr Home Page, http://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/flickr/details.
html.
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A. TRANSBORDER ISSUES
Article 25(1) of the Directive 95/45/EC requires organizations transferring personal data to countries outside the European Union to ensure
an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of those individuals whose personal data is transferred. Some blogs may have material other than texts on its site. These blogs may contain photos, videos,
pictures, and audio (podcasts). Note that in some web sites which host
these sites, subscribers must abide by US law rather than EU law.
According to the analysis in Lindqvist, the ECJ stated that the
uploading of Webpages does not constitute the transfer of personal data
under Article 25, because the Article was drafted when an issue involving Web pages might have not been forseeable. This does not mean that
one would not be "processing" personal data as covered under the DPD,
but that Article 25 of the DPD would not apply according to the
Lindqvist ruling:
Given, first, the state of development of the internet at the time Directive 95/46 was drawn up and, second, the absence, in Chapter IV, of
criteria applicable to use of the internet, one cannot presume that the
Community legislature intended the expression transfer [of data] to a
third country to cover the loading, by an individual in Mrs. Lindqvist's
position, of data onto an internet page, even if those data are thereby
made accessible to persons in third countries with the technical means to
access them. If Article 25 of Directive 95/46 were interpreted to mean
that there is transfer [of data] to a third country every time that personal
data are loaded onto an internet page, that transfer would necessarily be
a transfer to all the third countries where there are the technical means
needed to access the internet. The special regime provided for by Chapter IV of the directive would thus necessarily become a regime of general
application, as regards operations on the internet. Thus, if the Commission found, pursuant to Article 25(4) of Directive 95/46, that even one
third country did not ensure adequate protection, the Member States
would be obliged to prevent any personal data being placed on the internet. Accordingly, it must be concluded that Article 25 of Directive 95/
46 is to be interpreted as meaning that operations such as those carried
out by Mrs. Lindqvist do not as such constitute a transfer [of data] to a
third country. It is thus unnecessary to investigate whether an individual from a third country has accessed the internet page concerned or
whether the server of that hosting service is physically in a third country. The reply to the fifth question must therefore be that there is no
transfer [of data] to a third country within the meaning of Article 25 of
Directive 95/46 where an individual in a Member State loads personal
data onto an internet page which is stored with his hosting provider
which is established in that State or in another Member State, thereby
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making those data accessible to anyone who connects to the internet, including people in a third country (emphasis added). 8 '
B.

DOES THE TRANS-BORDER TRANSFER OF PERSONAL DATA FALL
WITHIN THE PERMITTED DEROGATIONS?

Two issues are of concern when dealing with personal data and a
trans-border transfer. First, is the principle of fairness and second, is
whether the safety mechanisms that national governments set in place
for trans-border transfer of personal data are adequate. The UK's approach to this issue balances the requirements of fairness and efficiency
by requiring data controllers to determine the appropriate levels of protection necessary to any particular circumstance. However, there still
exists a conundrum. How do we monitor and ensure that adequate levels
of protection are maintained? Can or should contractual mechanisms
imposed by web site operators and Internet Service Providers be relied
upon to displace the safeguards set in place under the DPA?
C.

BLOGS AS DATA PROCESSING SITES

Given the ease with which information can now be processed and the
avenues for dissemination, there are some important issues. Many have
commented on the potential employment and intellectual property issues, defamatory and hate speech issues, and privacy.8 2 The Internet
protocols enable data to assume a viral characteristic and control over
the integrity and authenticity of information cannot be underestimated.
There is an emerging practice of "counter-Googling."s 3 Visitors to a blog
now use the information from the blog to find additional information
about persons or events:
If consumers put their entire life stories online, and you as a company candidly refer to this public information AND make them an offer
they can't refuse, more sales may be on the way. And bloggers, savvy
consumers by nature, will no doubt introduce a 'no unsolicited sales' seal,
the moment they grow tired of COUNTER-GOOGLING, making it clear
84
what's off limits and what's fair game.
More importantly, can the DPD consider both web hosts and individuals who have blog or social networking sites data controllers who must
81. Lindqvist, upra note. 11, at paras. 68-71.
82. See Daniel Solove, A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in the Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. L.R., 1195 (2006); see also L.B. Ribstein, FROM BRICKS TO PAJAMAS:
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF AMATEUR JOURNALISM, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185 (2006); see
also S. Vine, Blogs, Blawgs and Legal Issues, EBL 6(8) 7-9 (2004).
83. A. Hill, This Week We Want to Know All About. . .Counter.Googling, OBSERVER,
Feb. 11, 2007, http://technology.guardian.co.uk/print0,,329712441-117802,00.html.
84. Trendwatching.com. Counter-googlinghttp://www.trendwatching.com/trends/2003/
09/COUNTER-GOOGLING.html, (last accessed Apr. 27, 2007).
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be responsible for processing.8 5 The point here is that individuals, using
blog or social networking sites for personal purposes are reliant on commercial intermediaries to deal with the technical functionality. In the
light of the applicable principles of fairness that provides an overarching
framework, it is arguable that the DPD will hold both sets of parties
accountable.

D.
1.

EXEMPTIONS

Balancing rights of expression and rights of privacy

Article 9 of the DPD enables Member States to provide for "exemptions or derogations from the provision... where this was carried out
solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with
the rules governing freedom of expression."
The transposition of this provision by EU Member States has not
been entirely consistent (as each Member State has transposed this provision differently),8 6 but the ECJ was clear to emphasize that personal
data does not conflict with the freedom of expression. However, it may
be difficult to balance the competing interests such as, rights of expression and rights of privacy in such cases. In Ramsbro,8 7 an individual
posted details of bank officials on a web site. The purpose behind the web
site was to alert individuals of unscrupulous banks and unethical network-capitalists. The Court described much of the material on the web
site that contained personal information as having an insulting nature.
The Swedish Supreme Court had to weigh the balance between the protection of an individual's privacy and an individual's freedom of expression and took into account, the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights.
The Swedish Supreme Court held that:
The fact that electronic or other media published texts contain insulting or deprecating data or judgments does not mean that this takes
away its character of journalistic purpose. On the contrary such a fact is
to be looked upon as a normal ingredient within the scope of a critical
societal debate. As the European Court of Human Rights has stated, the
85. Council Directive 95/46, Article 2, 2002 O.J. (L 201) (broadly defining a "data controller" as 'the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. . .' and therefore, in the light of this definition, individuals could also be regarded as "data controllers" who process personal information); see eg. Lindqvist.
86. See Douwe Korff, Comparative Summary of National laws, EC STUDY ON IMPLEMENTATION OF DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE, Sept. 2002, 130-37, http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/lawreport/consultation/univessex-comparativestudy-en.pdf.
87. Ramsbro B-293-00, June 2001 at p. 11.
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freedom of information also includes the right to present such an expression and such opinions and thoughts which insult, shock or disturb.. .The limitation to "solely" journalistic purposes [as provided under
the Personal Data Act 1998] alludes firstly to make clear that a processing of personal data, which takes place in the mass media and by journalists for other than journalistic purposes are outside the limitation.
The processing by mass media of personal data, for instance for factoring, advertising or mapping of reader's profiles, thus falls outside the
limitation.. .Any support for an idea that the expression "solely" should
be interpreted as meaning that it, independent of the fact that publishing has had journalistic purposes, should be possible, on the basis of the
Act on Personal Data, to penalize an attack on someone else's good name
88
and reputation cannot be considered to exist.
The question is how do we balance the freedom of expression and the
89
right to privacy in the blog? For example:
Stella, my eighties style yuppie witch of a team leader, has spun
herself into a frenzy of hyperactivity. She has been working, in her own
words, "like a bastard mad hard working bastard mega-bitch," adding
that as long as her friend Becky is away in China, she might as well
immerse herself in work, "because what else is there?" I pondered this
for a split-second, before she answered that it's all about incentives.
She's made it her goal to take Becky sausage tasting on her return from
foreign shores. She wants to prove to her that we can live the high life
here in Preston just as well as any bunch of Beijing bankers. 90
In this example, if no one can identify who the person is, then it is
not likely to fall within the scope of the DPD. However, if individuals
can be identified, then this situation would fall within the scope of the
DPD, more specifically a wider definition under Article 2(a). The question is whether this would fall outside the scope Article 3(2) DPD. Applying a narrow interpretation, Article 3(2) is unlikely to apply. It may be
arguable that individuals intend only private viewers of their web sites if
they take steps such that the web page was not available to the public
domain. If one were to apply the UK's definition of personal data, then it
is possible to contend that one did not intend to process personal data as
defined by the UK Court of Appeal, because such data would have to be
more than biographical information. However, as argued above, such a
definition is unlikely to be found analogous to the Lindqvist decision.

88. Id.
89. A Free Man in Preston, http://afreemaninpreston.blogspot.coml
24, 2008).
90. Id.

(last visited Jan.
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CONCLUSION

A proper assessment of the scope of Article 3(2) and its standard
setting function cannot be divorced from social and technological innovations encountered in the Internet. Social networking sites provide an apt
example of the way the convergence of technological innovation and society's expectations is challenging orthodox understanding of privacy and
the ability of regulatory institutions to regulate the activities of data controllers. From the perspective of individuals who subscribe to social
networking sites, the issue of whether Article 3(2) should or should not
be extended may appear to be inconsequential. The growth of blogs and
podcasts raises potential challenges to the existing European data-protection framework and national data protection laws. 9 1 The Lindqvist
decision highlights the tension that exists in protecting the privacy of an
individual on the one hand, and the freedom of expression of the other. If
the data protection laws are to evolve in a coherent and principled manner, then a broader perspective of data governance must be adopted and
one which integrates businesses and consumers into the regulatory process. Only when we recognize the paradox of new technology and the
significance of the way society views privacy, will we then avoid specific
dangers, such as those identified in the Bangemann Report. 9 2 As a result, Article 3(2) needs to be re-thought and revised.
Currently, Europe leads the world in the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data. The application of new technology, however, affects
highly sensitive areas such as those dealing with the images of individuals, their communication, their movements, and their behavior. With
this in mind, it is quite possible that most Member States will react to
these developments by adopting protection, including trans-frontier control of new technologies and services.
91. Council Directive 95/46, Art. 2, 2002 O.J. (L 201) (referencing the EU Member
States that have implemented the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC).
92. Members of the High-Level Group on the Information Society, Europe and the
Global InformationSociety: Bangemann Report Recommendations to the EuropeanCouncil,
http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=18174 (last visited May 2, 2007).

